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INTRODUCTION

"Was there ever such a profession as ours anyhow? We speak of
ourselves as practicing law, as teaching it, as deciding it, and not one of
us can say what law means."' Justice Cardozo's observation about the
elusive nature of the American legal system lies at the heart of the controversy over retroactivity. Questions about whether judges may prospectively overrule the law raise fundamental issues concerning the
nature of law and the proper role for the judiciary.
In 1991, the Supreme Court issued its latest opinion on prospective
overruling and judicial rulemaking. In James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia,2 the Court ruled that modified or selective prospectivity is impermissible.3 The issue in Beam was whether the Court's decision in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias4 should apply retroactively. The Bacchus
Court had invalidated a Hawaii liquor tax that distinguished imported
1. Margaret Hall, ed., Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo at 43 (Fallon Publications, 1947) (Address before the New York State Bar Association Meeting, Jan. 22, 1932) ("Car-

dozo's Address").
2. 111 S.Ct 2439 (1991).
3. There are two types of prospectivity. Pure prospectivity means that the courts will apply
the new rule only to cases arising after the rule's announcement. Courts applying modified or selective prospectivity will grant the litigant in the case relief but will not apply the new rule to other
cases that arose before its announcement. Justice Souter explained the various forms of prospectivity and retroactivity in Beam. Id. at 2443-44.
4. 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
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and local alcoholic products.5 After this decision, the James B. Beam
Distilling Company (Beam) sued Georgia seeking a refund of all taxes
collected in 1982, 1983, and 1984, under a similar state tax statute.6 The
Beam Court concluded that Bacchus must apply retroactively.7 Justice
Souter, writing for the Court but joined only by Justice Stevens, concluded that the Bacchus decision must apply retroactively because selective or modified prospectivity is impermissible.8 He ruled that
considerations of fairness and stare decisis precluded the Court from
applying different rules to similarly situated litigants.9
In one of three separate concurring opinions, Justice White agreed
with Justice Souter that Beam should receive the benefit of the
Bacchus judgement.10 However, he emphasized that the Beam decision
should have no effect on pure prospectivity, which should remain a viable judicial option governed by the Court's prior decisions."
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun argued that all
prospectivity, whether selective or pure, is unconstitutional. 2 He reasoned that only legislatures have the power to promulgate new rules
which will be applied only prospectively and that the limited nature of
judicial review requires a court to decide the case before it based on
whatever rule it decides is correct. 13 Justice Blackmun argued that to
allow otherwise would weaken the doctrine of stare decisis by allowing
the Court to avoid the disruption that necessarily results from its adoption of a new rule. Hence, he concluded that the combination of retroactive effect and stare decisis was necessary to constrain the Court from
routinely announcing new rules.' 4
Justice Scalia, in the third concurring opinion, generally agreed
with Justice Souter's reasoning.' 5 However, he found the plurality's inquiry unimportant because he believed, like Justice Blackmun, that any
sort of prospectivity was unconstitutional. 6 Citing Marbury v.
Madison's 7 description of judicial power, Justice Scalia argued that
judges make law only as if they were finding it. He reasoned that a
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
law is").

Id. at 273.
Ga. Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (Michie 1982).
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2441.
Id. at 2445-46.
Id. at 2446.
Id. at 2448-49 (White concurring).
Id. at 2449 (White concurring).
Id. at 2449 (Blackmun concurring).
Id. at 2450 (Blackmun concurring).
Id. (Blackmun concurring).
Id. (Scalia concurring).
Id. (Scalia concurring).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (stating that it is the judiciary's power "to say what the
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judge's function is to discern what the law is, not to declare what it
shall be.'" Justice Scalia concluded that the difficulties inherent in this
mandatory retroactivity serve to check the power of the judiciary and to
discourage courts from overruling precedent. 9
Justice O'Connor argued in dissent that Bacchus should not have
applied retroactively either to itself or to the Beam case.2 0 She concluded that Justice Souter misapplied the ideas of stare decisis and
equality, and she further explained that both fairness and stare decisis
supported prospective application.2 1 As to constitutional criticisms, she
referred to her plurality opinion in American Trucking Associations v.
Smith, 22 in which she wrote that one of the Court's functions is to decide the retroactivity of new rules. Adopting a more pragmatic approach than that of Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
because the Court has the power under Marbury to say what the law is,
23
when the Court changes its mind, the law changes as well.
In the seventy-five years since commentators first began advocating
prospective overruling as a judicial option,2 4 courts have developed a
wide variety of conclusions and applications. 2 The fact that five justices wrote separate opinions in Beam demonstrates the Court's continuing struggle with the issue.
This Recent Development examines the Court's most recent attempt to settle the prospectivity dilemma. Part II examines the legal
history of prospectivity, the Court's movement to adopt prospectivity in
the 1960s, and the Court's recent retraction of its authority to apply
rules prospectively. Part III discusses the Beam decision and the five
opinions it generated. Part IV analyzes the decision and argues that the
Court's evolving reversion to retroactivity is misguided. Part V concludes that prospective overruling should continue to be a judicial
option.
18.

Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451 (Scalia concurring).

19.

Id. (Scalia concurring).

20. Id. (O'Connor dissenting).
21. Id. at 2451-52 (O'Connor dissenting).
22. 496 U.S. 167 (1990). See notes 78 to 97 and accompanying text.
23. 111 S. Ct. at 2451.
24. See Donald Canfield, Speech to the South CarolinaBar Ass'n, Rep. S.C. Bar Ass'n at 1721 (1917); Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1, 7-9 (1960) (tracing the early origins of prospectivity).
25. See John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied," 61 N.C. L. Rev. 745 (1983) (tracing a number of different uses of the retroactivity doctrine).
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LEGAL BACKGROUND

Until this century, the Court always had applied its decisions retroactively.26 William Blackstone 7 provided the foundation for retroactive
operation 28 with his description of the judiciary's function as enunciating the law in existence at the time of the case at bar. He believed that
prior decisions served only as eiiidence of the law,29 and that if the
court overturned prior decisions, those prior decisions were not bad law,
but rather were not law at all. 30 This declaratory theory necessarily implies retroactivity, for if the law had been there all along, the court's
new decision did not change it. 31 Intellectual enthusiasm for scientific
developments in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced a
characterization of law as an entity separate from judicial interpretation. 32 As scientists began to discover the fundamental laws of nature
and mathematics, legal thinkers believed that judges could discover
general rules which would govern society. 33
The declaratory role of the judiciary thus became embedded in
American legal heritage. Early in this century, however, legal commentators began to question the equities of making every new rule retroactive. 34 These writers were uncomfortable with the disruption to the
settled expectations of parties that retroactive application caused.35
They also considered the Blackstonian justification for retroactivity naive and outdated. 36 Modern realist jurisprudential theorists argued that
the law should be determined and judged by its results, not by its adherence to neatly defined rules. 37 For example, Justice Cardozo argued
that courts should rule prospectively when it is necessary to protect the
26. See Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes dissenting) (stating
that judicial decisions have been retroactive for a thousand years).
27. See William M. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 69 (1765).
28. See Note, Prospective Overrulingand Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71
Yale L. J. 907 (1962).
29. Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at 69 (cited in note 27).
30. Id. at 70.
31. See Note, 71 Yale L. J. at 908-09 (cited in note 28).
32. See Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1653,
1655 (1990).
33. Id.
34. See Charles E. Carpenter, Court Decisions and the Common Law, 17 Colum. L. Rev. 593
(1917); Robert Hill Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an
Overruling Decision, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 230 (1918); John Henry Wigmore, Problems of Law at 7982 (C. Scribner's Sons, 1920).
35. Note, Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Decision, 42 Yale L. J. 779, 782 (1933).
36. See, for example, W. J. Adams, Jr., ConstitutionalLaw-Protection of Rights Acquired
in Reliance on Overruled Decision, 11 N.C. L. Rev. 323, 329 (1933) (referring to the Blackstonian
justification as "antiquated dogma and useless fiction").
37. See Cardozo's Address at 31 (cited in note 1).
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reliance interests of the parties. 3 8 The Supreme Court first heard the
issue in Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil and Refinery Company.39 In an opinion by Justice Cardozo,40 the unanimous Court allowed a state court to apply its decision prospectively. The Court
concluded that nothing in the Constitution prohibited a state court
from prospectively overruling a case. 4 '
A.

The Beginning of Prospectivity: Linkletter v. Walker

However, not until 1965, in Linkletter v. Walker,42 did the Supreme Court hear the issue of prospective overruling. In Linkletter, the
Court decided not to apply Mapp v. Ohio4s retroactively. Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado," and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state officers. The Court would have cast thousands of
convictions into doubt by giving retroactive effect to Mapp.45 So, confronted with the practical difficulties of retroactive application in decisions like Mapp, Gideon v. Wainright,46 Escobedo v. Illinois,47 and soon
thereafter, Miranda v. Arizona,48 each of which forced fundamental
changes in criminal procedure, the Court concluded that prospectivity
is appropriate in some cases.49 The Linkletter Court examined the prior
history of the rule in question, the purpose and effect of the rule, and
38. See id. at 33-35. Justice Cardozo articulated that prospectivity should apply when "the
rule that we are asked to apply is out of touch with the life about us." This is so, Cardozo continued, when the rule "has been made discordant by the forces that generate a living law." Cardozo
concluded, therefore, that "[w]e apply it to this case because the repeal might work hardship to
those who have trusted to its existence. We give notice, however, that any one trusting to it hereafter will do so at his peril." Id. at 34.
39. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
40. One commentator has attributed Justice Cardozo's recurrent interest in retroactivity and
reliance interests to an experience he had while in law school. After Justice Cardozo began his two
year program at Columbia Law School, the administration extended the program to three years
and required current students to stay a third year. Justice Cardozo refused, and never got his law
degree. Levy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 10 n. 31 (cited in note 24).
41. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Co., 287 U.S. 358, 366 (1932).
42. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
43. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
44. 388 U.S. 25 (1949).
45. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 636.
46. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and ruling that a
defendant is entitled to a lawyer in all criminal cases).
47. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (ruling that once one becomes a suspect he or she has the right to a
lawyer).
48. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (ruling that suspects must be warned of their right to remain silent).
In Johnson v. New Jersey the Supreme Court declared that the Miranda and Escobedo decisions
were not retroactive. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
49. The type of prospectivity at issue in cases like these usually was selective prospectivity.
For example, in Miranda, the Court chose to rule on only four of the pending cases that raised
Miranda types of claims. It denied certiorari on the other 129. See Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis,
Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 Hastings L. J. 533, 558-59
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the question of whether retroactive application would further or retard
its operation." The Court concluded that retroactive operation of the
Mapp rule would not serve the exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring
official misconduct, that the state had relied on the pre-Mapp law not
requiring exclusion, and that retroactive effect would require multitudes of hearings and retrials without really improving the accuracy of
the judgements. 5 Accordingly, the Court ruled that the exclusionary
rule would not apply retroactively to convictions that had become final
before Mapp.52
The Court continued this balancing approach two years later in
Stovall v. Denno 3 In Stovall, the Court held that a newly enunciated
right to have counsel present at line-ups5 4 would not apply to cases
where the line-ups were held prior to the announcement of these decisions. " The Court refined Linkletter's purpose, reliance, and effect
standard. To determine whether a decision would have retroactive application, the Court announced that it would look to the purpose the
new standards serve, the extent of law enforcement authorities' reliance
on the old standards, and the effect that a retroactive application of the
rule would have on the administration of justice. 5 e These elements
enunciated in Stoval 57 remained the test in5 criminal cases until the Supreme Court decided Griffith v. Kentucky.
B. Prospectivity Applied to Civil Cases: Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
For civil cases, the Court adopted a test similar to the Stovall test.
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,59 the issue was whether a state statute of
limitations would apply to a personal injury case or whether the more
lenient statute of limitations allowed under admiralty law would apply
to the action. The plaintiff in Chevron had filed his action within the
requisite time period for admiralty law, but not within the time period
required under state law. Meanwhile, in a separate case, the Supreme
Court had held that state law applied to situations such as that of the
(1977). The practical effect of denying certiorari to 129 of 133 cases was that only four defendants
benefitted from the Court's expansion of defendants' rights in Miranda.
50. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
51. Id. at 636-38.
52. Id. at 639-40.
53. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
54. Id. The Supreme Court defined this right in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
and U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
55. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 393. Stovall did apply the new rule to the defendant in the case. Id.
56. Id. at 297.
57. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. and Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity,and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1743 (1991).
58. 479 U.S. 314 (1987). See notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
59. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
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plaintiff in Chevron. 0 In concluding that the state rule should not bar
the plaintiff's suit, the Court first determined whether a nonretroactive
application of the decision established a new principle of law. Further,
the Court looked to the history, purpose and effect of the rule,"' and the
effect of retroactivity on its operation. Finally, the Court weighed the
inequities that retroactive application imposed.6 2 The Court believed it
was necessary to protect parties who relied on an established rule.
Thus, in refusing to retroactively apply the new rule the Court found
both that the decision established a new principle and that inequities
would result from retroactive application. The Court argued that the
most any party could do was rely on the law as it existed.63
While nonretroactivity initially commanded broad support from
both liberals, who viewed it as a basic necessity for achieving a just
result, and conservatives, who saw it as a way of limiting the effect of
these reforms, 4 the principle eventually drew heavier criticism. In 1969,
Justice Harlan changed his stance on the issue and began to argue
against prospectivity.6 5 Even though he did not premise his criticism on
the Blackstonian theory, 6 Justice Harlan felt that the framework the
Court had developed since Linkletter resulted in inequitable outcomes.6 7 In addition, he argued that nonretroactivity freed courts from
following controlling precedent and allowed them to act as legislators
by creating rules designed only for the future.6 8 But Justice Harlan
failed to convince a majority of the Court, and the Linkletter approach
remained the standard through the years of the Warren Court. However, his views partially served as the basis for the Rehnquist Court's
current reformulation of the retroactivity rule. 9
C. The End of Prospectivity in Criminal Cases: Griffith v.
Kentucky
In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, 70 the Court followed Justice
Harlan's approach in criminal cases. The Court held that new rules
60. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969). In Rodrigue, the Court decided
that state law, not admiralty law, applied to stationary artificial structures in the sea. Id. at 355.
61. Chevron at 106-07 (Linkletter's language).
62. Id. at 107.
63. Id.
64. See Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 676 (1971) (Justice Harlan concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
65. Id. See also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
66. See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 677.
67. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan dissenting) (stating that he believed it generated
"incompatible rules and inconsistent principles").
68. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 677.
69. See generally Fallon and Meltzer, 104 Harv. L. Rev. at 1744 (cited in note 57).
70. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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must be applied retroactively to all criminal cases on direct review.7'1 At
issue in Griffith was whether Batson v. Kentucky7 2 should have retroactive effect. The Court had held in Batson that the equal protection
clause prohibited race-based peremptory challenges of potential jurors. 73 In an opinion Justice Blackmun authored, the Court drew heavily from Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist and Mackey.7 4 Justice
Blackmun concluded that nonretroactive application was a legislative,
not a judicial function, 5 and that selective prospectivity violated the
principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same. 76 Therefore, the Court abandoned all exceptions to applying retroactivity to
77
criminal cases on direct review.
However, in 1990, in American Trucking Associations v. Smith,7
the Court refused to expand Griffith to civil cases. In American Trucking, a group of out-of-state truckers had alleged that an Arkansas highway tax violated the commerce clause since it charged higher costs to
out-of-state truckers than to in-state truckers. 79 The plaintiffs lost in
state court and appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Before
the Court heard the appeal, however, the Court decided that a similar
Pennsylvania tax was unconstitutional."0 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court ordered a remand of the Arkansas case to the state court.8 ' While
ruling that the tax was unconstitutional, the Arkansas Supreme Court
denied the truckers relief82 because it concluded that based on the
Chevron8 3 test it should not apply retroactively Scheiner. The truckers
71. Id. at 322.
72. 476 U.S. 79 (1986), overruling Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
73. Id. at 93-95. The Court previously had held Batson nonretroactive in habeas corpus
cases. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
74. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text. The Griffith decision was foreshadowed by U.S.
v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), where the Court quoted Justice Harlan and concluded that "retroactivity must be rethought." Id. at 548 (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 258 (Harlan dissenting)). See
also Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321-22.
75. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322-23.
76. Id. at 323, 327. Defendants Batson and Griffith were tried in the same state court by the
same prosecutor only three months apart. The Court believed that to allow the "fortuities of the
judicial process" to determine the outcome of these cases would be unfair. Id. at 327.
77. Id. at 328. By "final or not on direct review," the Court meant to include cases where the
availability of appeal was exhausted, the time for a certiorari petition had passed, or certiorari had
been denied. See U.S. v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542 n.8 (1982) (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965)).
78. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
79. Id. at 169-70.
80. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
81. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Gray, 483 U.S. 1014 (1987).
82. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, 295 Ark. 43, 746 S.W.2d 377 (1988). The state court
did allow a refund of the taxes that were ordered placed in escrow by Justice Brennan during the
litigation. See 746 S.W.2d at 379.
83. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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promptly appealed again to the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, concluded that the Chevron test did require
prospective application.8 4 She reasoned that Scheiner was a clear break
from past precedent, that retroactive application would not deter future
violations, and that retroactive effect would have disruptive consequences for the state and its citizens."5 She also argued that Griffith's
reasoning was inapplicable to this case because Griffith only represented an expansion of procedural protection for criminal defendants.8 6
In his dissent, Justice Stevens rejected Justice O'Connor's characterization of the question as a choice of law issue. 7 Rather, he argued
that the Chevron line of cases were better read to present retroactivity
as a remedial principle. 8 Justice Stevens reasoned that the tax had always been unconstitutional, even before Scheiner. Thus, he argued that
the question before the Court was what remedy the truckers deserved
and that this question was a state law issue, even though the Constitution delineated the minimal remedy. 9 Accordingly, Justice Stevens
would have remanded the case9" to the Arkansas Supreme Court to determine whether the truckers were entitled to relief on other grounds. 1
Justice Stevens also heavily analogized to the Griffith opinion. He
argued that the critical element in Griffith was not that it was a criminal case, but that it was not the judiciary's function to choose which law
to apply to cases before it.9 2 He contended that once a party is before
the Court, the Court should decide the case based on its best current
understanding of the law and not be concerned with disturbing settled
expectations. That is, the Court ought not make choice of law determinations based on the equities presented by individual cases. 3 He rejected the premise that the Chevron analysis determined rights under
84. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 183. The plurality consisted of Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy.
85. Id. at 182-83 (plurality opinion) (giving, as an example, the inconvenience of refunding
the money collected under the tax).
86. Id. at 197-98 (plurality opinion).
87. Id. at 209-12 (Stevens dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
88. Id. (Stevens dissenting).
89. Id. at 210-12 (Stevens dissenting).
90. Id. at 224-25 (Stevens dissenting).
91. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
McKesson, that was consolidated with American Trucking, involved a Florida tax that clearly
violated the commerce clause under Bacchus. The Court ruled that the Constitution required Florida to provide retroactive relief to taxpayers. The different results in these two cases show the
importance of the new law or clear break analysis to the Court.
92. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 214 (Stevens dissenting).
93. Id. (Stevens dissenting).
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the law and argued that the test only determined appropriate
remedies. 4
Justice Scalia provided the determinative vote in the case. From
the outset, he declared that prospectivity is unconstitutional and
adopted a Blackstonian theory that judges only find the law. 5 However,
because he disagreed with the Scheiner decision and the Court's entire
commerce clause approach, Justice Scalia refused to grant relief to the
truckers.9 6 He also emphasized the importance of the litigant's settled
expectations and7 stated that the doctrine of stare decisis argued against
9
awarding relief.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT
The Beam case began when Beam brought an action seeking a refund of $2.4 million, the full amount of excise taxes that the company
had paid in 1982, 1983, and 1984.98 Beam alleged that the Georgia statute imposing the tax was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 9
The trial court agreed that the tax was unconstitutional but refused to
award any refund, declaring that its ruling would only apply prospectively. 100 Beam then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which afThe Georgia Supreme Court
firmed the lower court's judgement.'
agreed with the lower court that the tax was simple economic protectionism and was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's ruling in
Bacchus.'0o Further, it applied the Chevron analysis and affirmed the
trial court's prospective application, 03 reasoning that the finding of unconstitutionality was a new rule since the statute had previously been
upheld in the face of similar challenges. 04 The Georgia Supreme Court
also balanced the equities involved in retroactive application. It reasoned that, on the one hand, Beam probably had already passed on the
$2.4 million tax to Georgia consumers; accordingly, any refund would
94. Id. at 219-23 (Stevens dissenting).
95. Id. at 201 (Scalia concurring).
96. Id. (Scalia concurring).
97. Id. (Scalia concurring).
98. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2442.
99. See Ga. Code Ann. § 3-4-60 (Michie 1982). The statute doubled the excise tax for alcoholic beverages which were imported rather than produced from Georgia grown products. In 1985,
after the Court's decision in Bacchus, the Georgia legislature amended the statute. 1985 Ga. Laws
665 § 2.
100. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State, 259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1989).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 96.
103. The Georgia Supreme Court previously had adopted the Chevron test in Flewellen v.
Atlanta Casualty Co., 250 Ga. 709, 300 S.E.2d 673 (1983).
104. See Scott v. State, 187 Ga. 702, 2 S.E.2d 65 (1939).
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result in a windfall to alcohol producers.1 0 5 The probable windfall argued against retroactive application. Yet, on the other hand, the Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that the state would have to refund at
least $30 million' 0 6 which it had collected in good faith under a statute
that had withstood prior constitutional challenge, Given the inequity of
granting alcohol producers a windfall while penalizing the state, and the
justifiable reliance on the statute, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that 0 7the rule announced in Bacchus would not apply
retroactively.1
On certiorari, the Supreme Court'0 8 reversed and remanded the
case to the Georgia Supreme Court for determination of appropriate
relief. The case produced no majority opinion, and in fact, only one justice joined the Court's opinion as four other justices wrote separate
opinions.1"'
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter rejected selective prospectivity and claimed not to comment on pure prospectivity."10 Initially, he
stated that the retroactivity question involved a choice of federal law
since the question was whether to apply the old or the new rule."' He
argued that once the Court decided to apply a law retroactively, remedial issues would arise. 12 Justice Souter then discussed the three options available to the Court."1 3 He concluded that the Court had never
applied Chevron to modified civil prospectivity" 4 and that since
Court needed to decide its furBacchus was applied retroactively, 1the
5
ther application in the case at bar.
105. Beam, 382 S.E.2d at 97.
106. At least two other suits were pending against the state in which producers were asking
for over $28 million. Id. at 96-97.
107. Id. at 97. The dissenting justice argued that retroactive application was mandatory because the statute was void ab initio once it was found unconstitutional. That is, the statute must
never have existed. Id. at 98 (Smith dissenting).
108. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2439 (1991).
109. Justice Souter wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justice Stevens. Justice
White wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion which
Justices Scalia and Marshall joined. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion which Justices Blackmun and Marshall joined. Finally, Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion which Justices
Rehnquist and Kennedy joined.
110. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2448.
111. Id. at 2443.
112. Remedial issues are governed by state law. See American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 210-11
(Stevens dissenting).
113. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2442-44. Justice Souter discussed the options of full retroactivity,
modified prospectivity, and pure prospectivity.
114. See id. at 2443.
115. Justice Souter read Bacchus to have applied its new rule to the parties in that case.
Since the Court had remanded to the state court for a determination of the remedial issues without discussing retroactive application, he concluded that it had followed the normal practice of
retroactive operation. Further, he reasoned that since the new rule had been applied in Bacchus,
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Justice Souter argued that Griffith's1 16 equality principle applied in
the civil context as well. He reasoned that to treat two similarly situated litigants differently by applying different rules of law, based solely
on who brought the claim first, would be fundamentally unfair. 11 7 Thus,
he concluded that the party in this case, Beam, must be given the same
benefit of the new rule as was Bacchus. As to concerns about other potential litigants whose claims were barred by res judicata or statutes of
limitation, Justice Souter admitted that the distinction seemed arbitrary. However, he concluded that the need for finality in civil cases
requires some limitation on the retroactive effect." s
Finally, Justice Souter wrote that the choice of law issue should
never depend on the equities of the litigant's individual claims to prospectivity. 119 He contended that the nature of precedent does not allow
the law to shift and spring based on equitable principles. 2 0 Thus, Justice Souter limited the Chevron test to the determination of whether or
not the new rule would apply to all litigants. In other words, he reasoned that individual equities present in a single case would have no
bearing on the choice of law in that case. 12 Justice Souter then remanded the case to the state court for consideration of the remedial
issues. 122

Justice White, concurring in the judgment, agreed that Bacchus
had extended the benefit of the new rule to Bacchus Imports. 12' He argued that since no precedent for applying selective prospectivity to civil
cases existed, and since Griffith had abandoned the use of selective
prospectivity in criminal cases, Beam should benefit from the Bacchus
decision. 24 Justice White wrote separately, however, to emphasize the
continuing vitality of pure prospectivity. He believed Justice Souter
was inconsistent when he claimed not to speculate about the propriety
the question in Beam was whether to apply the new rule in a new case, (i.e., modified prospectivity) not whether to apply it to itself (i.e., pure prospectivity).
116. See notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
117. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327.
118. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2446-47. Justice Souter proclaimed that "[flinality must thus
delimit equality in a temporal sense, and we must accept as a fact that the argument for uniformity loses force over time." Id. at 2447.
119. Id. at 2447.
120. . He stated, "The applicability of rules of law are not to be switched on and off according
to individual hardship." Id. at 2448.
121. In other words, the Chevron test would apply only to cases in which courts were deciding pure prospectivity. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2448 (White concurring).
124. Id. at 2448-49 (White concurring). Justice White dissented in Griffith and still believed
the Court's decision in that case to be wrong, but he followed its holding here on the basis of stare
decisis. See id.
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of pure prospectivity yet cited pure prospectivity cases'2 5 in his attack
on selective prospectivity.' 2 He emphasized his support for both the
Chevron opinion and Justice O'Connor's opinion in American TruckWhite stated that he was unpersuaded by Justice
ing.'27 Finally, Justice
28
Scalia's reasoning.'
Justice Scalia, although he agreed in an abstract way with Justice
Souter's reasoning about the equality problems of selective prospectivity, thought Justice Souter did not go far enough. The problem with
prospectivity, both selective and pure, was not inequality, but unconstitutionality, he argued. 129 Justice Scalia contended that prospectivity violates the fundamental separation of powers as envisioned by the
framers.' 30 Under Justice Scalia's theory, judicial power is limited to
declaring what the law is,' 3 ' as Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v.
Madison."12 While claiming not to be so naive as to be unaware that
judges do make law, Justice Scalia argued that they must make it only
in the Blackstonian sense, as if they were finding it. 1"' He reasoned that
the inequities" imposed by mandatory retroactivity were intended as
checks on the judicial power, designed to restrict the judiciary's ability
to make law, presumably by taking away some of the incentive to overrule established decisions.3 5 Hence, because of his view of the separation of powers, Justice Scalia argued that all prospectivity is
unconstitutional.
For reasons very similar to Justice Scalia's, Justice Blackmun also
concurred in the judgement.'3 6 Justice Blackmun believed that the Supreme Court's role under Article III of the Constitution is to decide
cases and controversies only.' 37 He reasoned that judicial review compels a court to decide the case actually before it and if that case requires the court to adopt a new rule it must do so only in the context of
the case before it, applying the new principle to all concerned parties.'38
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 2443 (Souter concurring).
Id. at 2449 (White concurring).
See notes 78-91 and accompanying text.
Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (White concurring).
Id. at 2450 (Scalia concurring).

130. Id. (Scalia concurring).
131. Id. at 2451 (Scalia concurring).
132. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
133. Scalia wrote, "[b]ut they make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they were
'finding' it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is changed to, or what it will

tomorrow be." Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451.
134.

Id. (Scalia concurring).

135. Id. (Scalia concurring).
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 2449 (Blackmun concurring).
Id. (Blackmun concurring).
Id. at 2450 (Blackmun concurring).
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He declared that to act in any other way would force the court to act as
a legislature. Further, Justice Blackmun wrote that stare decisis compels retroactive effect of court decisions. 3 9 Finally, he argued that since
retroactivity forces a court to consider the consequences of overruling
its decisions, it makes it less likely that it will do so and gives stare
140
decisis its vitality.
Justice O'Connor, in dissent, accepted that the Court in Bacchus
had applied its new rule to the parties before it,' 4 ' but this was the
extent of her agreement with the other four opinions in Beam. She rejected both Justice Scalia's and Justice Blackmun's characterizations of
4
the judicial role. 42 She referred to her opinion in American Trucking' 3
and reemphasized that because the Court has the power under Marbury
to say what the law is, when the Court changes its interpretation, then
the law itself changes. 144 Thus, she argued that the Court has an obligation to decide what law should apply to facts antedating the law-changing decision. She concluded that the Court should make this
45
determination by applying the Chevron analysis.
Justice O'Connor also addressed Justice Souter's opinion and concluded that the Bacchus Court should have made its new rule prospective, 46 and that to continue to apply that inaccurate decision
retroactively would be inequitable. 47 Justice O'Connor reasoned that
the Bacchus decision created a new rule Which overruled a long line of
Supreme Court authority holding that the Twenty-First Amendment48
exempted state liquor regulations from the negative commerce clause.
Thus, she concluded that Hawaii's reliance on precedent was wellplaced. In addition, she observed that companies faced minimal hardship since they had passed on the cost of the tax to the Georgia con139. Id. (Blackmun concurring).
140. Id. (Blackmun concurring).
141. Id. at 2451 (O'Connor dissenting).
142. Id. (O'Connor dissenting).
143. American Trucking Assns. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (plurality opinion). See notes
78-91 and accompanying text.
144. Beam, 111 S.Ct. at 2451 (O'Connor dissenting).
145. Id. See notes 59 to 63 and accompanying text.
146. Justice O'Connor dissented in Bacchus based on the Twenty-First Amendment issue
presented therein. The dissent did not mention Chevron nor the retroactivity issue. Beam, 111 S.
Ct. at 2448 (White concurring).
147. Id. at 2448-49 (White concurring).
148. Id. at 2451-52 (O'Connor dissenting). See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 278-79 (Stevens dissenting and explaining the novelty of the decision); State Board v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59
(1936) (rejecting the same argument the Court eventually adopted in Bacchus); Hostetter v.
Idlewild Liquor Co., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964) (quoting IndianapolisBrewing Co. v. Liquor Control
Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939), (stating that "since the Twenty-First Amendment. . . the right
of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause")).
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sumers. 49 In contrast, she concluded that Georgia and its citizens
would face devastating liability.150 Under this analysis, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Bacchus Court should have applied its
new rule prospectively only. 151 She believed that to retroactively apply
1 52
the Bacchus rule again in Beam would compound the problem.
Justice O'Connor also argued that stare decisis and equality, Justice Souter's justifications for applying retroactivity, actually cut
against using retroactivity. 5 3 She reasoned that because the Bacchus
Court failed to even consider the retroactivity question, the Bacchus
case was of no value in the analysis of the Beam case.15 4 She believed
that the Court should not follow a previous decision if it did not mention the issue currently under the Court's consideration. Justice
O'Connor also reasoned that stare decisis allows those affected by the
law to plan according to settled principles;'5 5 thus, prospectivity allows
the Court to respect stare decisis even when it is compelled to change
the law. 5 6 She concluded that if a Chevron analysis determines that
retroactive operation would upset settled expectations in an inequitable
manner, then stare decisis cuts against the Court's reasoning in Beam.
Due to the inequity of retroactive application present in Bacchus, Justice O'Connor concluded that Beam should not compound that error. 57
IV.

ANALYSIS

While the Beam Court purported to consider only the limited question of selective prospectivity, it actually discussed other issues that
portray the Court's evolving attitude toward pure prospectivity and the
role of the judiciary in the American constitutional system. Even the
Court's analysis concerning modified prospectivity was driven by the
justices' views of the proper function of judges.
Narrowly read, the Beam decision is a question concerning the
meaning of stare decisis and equality.'58 On these issues, Justice Souter
149. See Beam, 111 S.Ct at 2454-55 (O'Connor dissenting). This is the same argument the
Georgia Supreme Court used in Beam. See note 105 and accompanying text.
150. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2455 (O'Connor dissenting).
151. Id. at 2456 (O'Connor dissenting).

152. Id. (O'Connor dissenting).
15:3. Id. at 2451-56 (O'Connor dissenting).
154. Id at 2452 (O'Connor dissenting).

155. Id. (O'Connor dissenting).
156. See American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 191-93 (1991) (O'Connor
plurality), and id. at 205 (Scalia concurring and arguing that retroactive liability would "upset
that litigant's settled expectations because the earlier decision for which stare decisis effect is
claimed . . . overruled prior law

. .

. [which] would turn the doctrine of stare decisis against the

very purpose for which it exists").
157. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2452 (O'Connor dissenting).
158. Justices Scalia, Blackmun, and Marshall did not even reach this point.
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argued that the most important consideration is treating similarly situated litigants the same. 159 He believed that the Court should apply the
same rule to all litigants. By contrast, Justice O'Connor did not believe
that an incorrect decision should bind future litigants simply to allow
for judicial consistency. 160 These conflicting points of view are driven by
two conflicting Supreme Court views of the proper role of the judiciary.
Justice Scalia and Justice Souter believe that the Court has a limited
role and should apply only settled principles of law to the cases before
it. Hence, both justices argued for retroactivity in Beam, even though
the equities of the case suggested that only prospective operation of the
decision was appropriate. The need for formal judicial consistency was
the driving force behind both opinions. 16
In contrast, Justice O'Connor was more concerned with the equities
of the case. In order to reach an equitable result, she was willing to
allow inconsistency in judicial opinions and admit that the Court engages in a rulemaking function. She emphasized the outcome of the
case rather than the neatness of the method the Court uses to reach
that outcome.' 6 '
Justice O'Connor's approach to the judicial role is the more sound
and proper of the two-courts should emphasize the outcomes of cases
in order to assure just results. 163 While there is a certain appeal to the
consistency of a more rigid system of law as espoused by Justices Scalia
and Souter, the law should not be formulated solely according to how
nicely it operates.
The pragmatic approach that Justice O'Connor advocates cuts in
favor of the continuing vitality of prospectivity. Unfortunately, the
Court seems to be returning to a formalistic approach to law that necessarily diminishes the use of prospectivity.6 4 Those who espouse the
pragmatic approach realize that judges do in fact make law. They discard the remnants of the Blackstonian theory that defines the proper
role of the judiciary as "finding" the law. Once one concedes that judges
do make law, the issue becomes when the courts should begin to apply
the new law. Courts should resolve this issue of prospectivity according
to the Supreme Court's analysis in Chevron. Further, when a Court
159. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2444.
160. Id. at 2451 (O'Connor dissenting) (arguing that since the Bacchus Court had not actually reached the retroactivity issue, the Court should not feel bound to apply its rule again simply
for the sake of symmetry).
161. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's positivist legal philosophy, see Beau Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Predictabilityin Constitutional Adjudication, 51 La. L. Rev. 623 (1991).
162. Id. at 624-65, n. 10.
163. See Cardozo's Address at 31 (cited in note 1).
164. Posner, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1663 (cited in note 32).
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makes a new law by overruling an old one, it has a responsibility to
decide at what point the new law takes effect.
The foremost objection to prospective judicial rulemaking is that it
is unconstitutional.'6 5 While commentators have described the constitutional problem in different ways, their primary concern is that prospective overruling is inherently legislative and is outside the judicial
power. 166 In Beam, Justice Scalia contended that prospectivity is a separation of powers problem.' 67 He reasoned that the founding fathers envisioned the function of the judiciary as finding the law as it exists-not
as making the law. Justice Scalia realized that judges actually do make
law, yet he argued that they make it only as if they were finding it and
that they should not appear to be making it.' 68 He declared that decidas opposed to declaring what it is
ing what the law will be tomorrow,
169
function.
judicial
a
not
today, is
Justice Blackmun framed the constitutional problem with prospectivity as a cases and controversies issue.' 7 0 He declared that the Court
only has the power to decide the actual cases before it. That is, the
Court is limited to determining rules to guide its decisions only in the
context of a present case, and it must always apply its holdings retroacparties before it, whether or not the decision announces a
tively to the
1 71
new rule.
The problem with the objection to prospectivity on the grounds
that it allows courts to legislate is that the entire argument assumes
that the judicary has a very limited role. The Blackstonian ideal that
judges serve only as explorers of an already-existing world of law is outdated, yet its influence on jurisprudential theory lingers.' 72 While most
commentators will admit that judges do make law, many theorists will
do so only when forced, and even then with a guilty conscience. Although everyone knows that judges make law, these theorists still cling
to the belief that judges must act as if they were not making law. In
many cases, including Beam, the Court makes new law.' 73 Even so, the
Blackstonian ideal of elderly, ornately-robed justices deciding each and
every case based only on settled principles prevents the Court from ad165. See notes 129-140 and accompanying text.
166. See Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
409 (1924). This article was one of the first to object to prospectivity.
167. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Scalia concurring).
168. Id. at 2451 (Scalia concurring).
169. Id. at 2450-51 (Scalia concurring).
170. See notes 136-140 and accompanying text.
171. "To do otherwise is to warp the role that we, as judges, play in a government of limited
powers." Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2450 (Blackmun concurring).
172. Levy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 4-5 (cited in note 24).
173. See note 148 and accompanying text.
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mitting that it actually is making law. Hence the Court is unable to
completely fulfill its proper role and its duty to state when the decision
will take effect and to which cases it will apply.
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Beam is an excellent example of the
lingering effect of the Blackstonian ideal. Justice Scalia claims not to be
so naive as to not realize that judges can actually make law, 17 4 and he
does view judicial rulemaking as an essential component of the judicial
process. 17 5 However, as Justice White noted in his concurrence in
Beam,17 Justice Scalia believes judges should never publicly admit that
they make rules. That is, although judges make law, they should pretend that they were finding it. 17 7 Justice Scalia adopts this view to protect his stance on the importance of strictly construing the
constitutional separation of powers. 7 s Allowing the Court to overrule
prospectively cannot be done without admitting that the judicial power
is more than finding the law and applying it to a present case. However,
the Court must make this very admission.
One commentator has framed the constitutional issue slightly differently. 7 9 He argues that the importance of separation of powers is to
ensure that those who are politically accountable make as many decisions as possible, 8 0 so when legislatures are capable of making law,
courts should allow them to do so. This scholar argues that this judicial
abstention serves to preserve respect for the judiciary, thereby preserving judicial power. The problem with this view is that in most situations
that require prospectivity, the legislature is either incapable of acting or
has not acted. The rules that courts typically overturn are either constitutional interpretations, such as Beam, or judge-made rules. In the former case, the legislature cannot act, for even under the most narrow
view of judicial power, the judiciary maintains the function of interpreting the Constitution. With respect to rules made by the judiciary, the
legislature has not acted: the Court has created an incorrect rule and
should act to correct it. If the Court waited for the legislature to correct
the rule, the Court would ignore its responsibility to correct itself. The
174. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451 (Scalia concurring). See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176-77 (1989) (reprinting of a speech by Justice Scalia
that gives a revealing look at his view of the function of the Supreme Court).
175. Scalia, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1185. He believes that higher courts must set down definite
rules whenever possible so that lower courts and citizens can rely on them. He emphasizes the
importance of predictability and consistency in Supreme Court rulemaking. See id.
176. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2449 (White concurring).
177. Id. at 2451 (Scalia concurring).
178. His view is simply that the legislature makes laws, the courts interpret them, and the
executive enforces them.
179. See Note, 71 Yale L. J. at 930-34 (cited in note 28).
180. Id. at 930.
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prospective effect of the overruling simply recognizes that people have
relied on the old rule and that the Court should be reluctant to punish
those who have relied on their decisions.
Courts have the power to give each of their decisions both retroactive and prospective effect, and, in fact, normal decisions have both retroactive and prospective effect.' 8 ' Justices Scalia, Blackmun and others
argue that the Court always must utilize its full power, although there
is no constitutional provision which mandates that it do so. Their objection to prospectivity stems from the idea that the Court should not act
as a legislature which promulgates rules but should operate only as an
interpreter. 8 2 This objection ignores the reality of judicial rulemaking
and supposes that the public is so naive as not to see what the Court is
doing. As Justice O'Connor stated in Beam, since the Supreme Court is
the final word on legal interpretation, whatever the Court says the law
is, it is.' 83 When the Court's interpretation changes, the law itself
changes-no distinct body of law can exist apart from the Court's conclusion. Article III of the Constitution grants the Court this lawmaking
18 4
power.
A second objection to prospective overruling is that it diminishes
the incentive to litigate. 8 5 That is, because litigants know that they
may be denied the benefit of any new law, they will be less likely to
appeal a decision based on novel theories. The result is a slower pace of
legal change. 188
This argument presumes, however, that prospectivity will become
the normal mode of overruling. In fact, since actual instances of honest
reliance are rare, 8 7 prospective overruling too seldom is used to slow
181. See Levy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 15 n.48 (cited in note 24).
182. See notes 129-140 and accompanying text. Traynor disagrees: "For all too many generations we justified mechanical retroactivity by the prim lore descended to us through Blackstone
that judges do no more than discover the law that marvelously has always existed, awaiting only
the judicial pen that would find the right words for all to heed. Once suitably bundled up it was
automatically retroactive, given the premise that it had been there all along in the bushes at the
bottom of the garden. The devotees of the discovery theory majestically dispelled the fractious
problem of the overruled decision. The overruling decision simply displaced it all the way back in
time so that it never had a life it could call its own. Under the spell on such moonspining, American courts soon upheld a retroactive operation of decisions that they would have invalidated in
statutes as contrary to the ex post facto clause, the impairment of contracts clause, or the due
process clause of the Constitution." Traynor, 28 Hastings L.J. at 535 (cited in note 49).
183. Beam at 2451 (O'Connor dissenting). See note 141 and accompanying text.
184. See U.S. Const., Art. III.
185. Levy, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 11 (cited in note 24).
186. See id.; Traynor, 28 Hastings L. J. at 546.
187. See Cardozo's Address at 34-35 (cited in note 1); Note, 71 Yale L. J. at 945-47 (cited in
note 28). The theory of prospectivity argues for the protection of reliance interests only when they
actually exist. The theory does not envision that every time the Court overrules itself it will have
to act prospectively because someone may have relied on the old rule. Only when litigants have
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the pace of legal change. In addition, even the possibility of benefiting
from retroactive application of a new Court rule" 8" should provide
enough incentive to litigate. 8 9 In other words, the mere possibility that
relief may be denied is not enough to discourage litigation.
Furthermore, institutional litigants, like Beam, would appeal even
if they knew they would be denied retroactive relief. 9 e Institutional litigants engage in multiple transactions and thus have a continuing interest in overturning the law, so the potential for prospective relief alone
provides enough reward.
Commentators also are concerned that prospective overruling
would be ineffective and lead to uncertainty about the Court's application of the new rule, since the language establishing the new rule is only
dictum and courts may not consider themselves bound by the decision. 9 ' However, the language is not dictum. Two issues are present in
a case involving the overruling of a decision. The first is whether the old
rule is effective and whether a new rule should be announced. If a court
decides to formulate a new rule, a second inquiry is necessary to determine how to give the new rule the most equitable effect. 192 This second
decision is based on the reliance on the old rule and any hardship that
retroactive operation may impose. Hence, this second inquiry is not dictum. 1 3 It is an essential part of the inquiry into the relief which should
be granted. Further, even if the retroactivity decision is dictum, no uncertainty as to which law was applicable would result. After all, the reasoning in favor of prospective operation in the original case would have
been to protect the reliance interests of the parties. The same Court
would not refuse to apply the new rule9 in a subsequent case, thereby
chastising the party for relying on the Court's prior dictum. 95 The very
purpose behind allowing prospective overruling is to allow the court to
announce a new rule without requiring a harsh and unjust retroactive
the same Court would then not apply the new
effect. To suggest that
96
rule is unrealistic.
justifiably relied on the old rule, as in Beam or Bacchus, does the Court consider prospectivity.
188. And in most cases it is more than just a possibility-there is a strong presumption for
retroactive operation.
189. Traynor, 28 Hastings L. J. at 547.
190. See id.
191. Since no relief is granted in the present case, the language establishing the new rule is
not part of the holding. It is no more than an attempted future ruling.
192. Beam, 111 S. Ct. at 2451-52 (O'Connor dissenting).
193. Traynor, 28 Hastings L. J. at 560 (cited in note 49).
194. In favor of the old rule which had been found inadequate.
195. "[Tihe uncertainty would not be grievous, for litigants could assume with little likelihood of disappointment that the dictum would be followed when the opportunity arrived to turn it
into a decision." Cardozo's Address at 36 (cited in note 1).
196. Some commentators have even suggested that the Court would be morally bound to
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Proponents of mandatory retroactivity also suggest that it serves as
a necessary obstacle to prevent courts from overruling prior decisions
too easily. 197 As a matter of policy, this argument is flawed. There is no
inherent value in maintaining a system whereby courts refuse to overrule their prior decisions. If a court decides that a present rule is unjust
or invalid, why should the system erect obstacles to the creation of a
just rule? The need for stability and predictability does not justify the
perpetuation of bad law, 198 and legal systems should be designed to produce good law rather than rigidly adhere to the status quo.'
Prospective overruling forces courts and commentators to admit
that judges do in fact make law. Only with this admission made can
theorists determine the most appropriate parameters and responsibilities of judicial power. Hence, once an accurate understanding of the
actual function and power of judges is formulated, judges can be more
effectively criticized. The result will be increased effectiveness and accuracy of judicial rulemaking by increasing the amount of information
the Court receives regarding belief as to the appropriate methodology in
rulemaking. 0 "
The Supreme Court did adopt prospectivity in Linkletter in
1965.01 In the immediate years after Linkletter, the Court's power to
make law was apparent to all. Unfortunately, the current Supreme
Court is reacting to allegations of undue judicial activism. One result is
a return to retroactivity. Justice Scalia, in particular, is determined to
resurrect the corpse of the Blackstonian ideal. The effect of such action
will be to obscure the judicial function and prevent honest analysis of
the Court and its proper role. Not coincidentally, scholars and jurists
objected to this during the forty year period preceding Linkletter.
apply the new rule. See Albert Kocourek and Harold Koven, Renovation of the Common Law
Through Stare Decisis, 29 Ill. L. Rev 971, 995-96 (1935).
197. This objection was first suggested in Note, The Effect of Overruled and OverrulingDecisions on Intervening Transactions,47 Harv. L. Rev. 1403, 1412 (1934). Justices Blackmun and
Scalia also referred to the braking function retroactivity serves in Beam. See Beam, 111 S. Ct. at
2450 (Blackmun concurring); id. at 2451 (Scalia concurring).
198. Traynor, 28 Hastings L. J. at 539 (cited in note 49).
199. Justice Cardozo thought that "insistence . . . [on] the virtues of symmetry and coherence can be purchased at too high a price; that law is a means to an end, and not an end in itself;
and that it is more important to make it consistent with what men and women really and truly
believe and do than what judges may at times have said in an attempt to explain and rationalize
the things they have done themselves." Cardozo's Address at 32 (cited in note 1).
200. "A judiciary that discloses what it is doing and why it does it will breed understanding.
And confidence based on understanding is more enduring than confidence based on awe." William
0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 4 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 152, 175 (1949).
201.

See notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Prospective overruling is a valuable method of ensuring that the
Supreme Court is able to change the law as society changes yet not
upset the settled expectations of parties who have relied on the old law.
Objections that prospectivity is unconstitutional ignore the reality of
judicial rulemaking and the function that the Court actually plays in
the American constitutional scheme. The Blackstonian ideal of declaratory decision-making is outdated. Prospective overruling allows the
Court to reach the equitable result without interfering with the role of
the legislature. Prospectivity should be judged by its ability to reach an
equitable result, not by how well it fits together with rigid, outdated
models of the judiciary.
K. David Steele

